• The Moscow Treaty marked a new era in the relationship between the United States and Russia.
• This short, legally binding document codified in a flexible manner both countries’ commitment to make deep strategic offensive reductions.
• It facilitated the transition from strategic rivalry to a genuine strategic partnership based on the principles of mutual security, trust, openness, cooperation and predictability.
• This treaty, in effect, sealed the reversal of the Bush administration's attitude toward Russia, which tentatively began in the summer of 2001 and came to fruition in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.
• Moscow was now on Washington's political radar as an ally or at least a friendly power.
• The United States finally acknowledged Russia's importance, not only because it possessed the world's second-largest nuclear arsenal, still ready to annihilate the United States and NATO countries in minutes (always a reason for Western anxiety), but also because of its remaining diplomatic clout in such parts of the world as Europe, the Middle East, Central and South Asia, as well as its mineral, human, and intellectual resources.
• This acknowledgment satisfied President Putin, who employed a political gambit, trading a weak and rather "meaningless" - in terms of traditional arms control punditry - "strategic arms reductions" treaty for Moscow's recognition by Washington as an important, albeit a junior, partner on the global level.
• There were positive signs demonstrating Washington's recognition of Moscow's potential role in fighting global terrorism, reducing WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) proliferation, advancing peace-building efforts, and promoting democracy and human liberties worldwide.

• During a summit meeting with President Putin in Washington, on Nov. 13, 2001, President Bush announced that the United States would reduce its “operationally deployed” strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next decade.
• The President stated that the United States would reduce its forces unilaterally, without signing a formal agreement with Russia. He stated that the two nations did not need “endless hours of arms control discussions” and arms control agreements “to reduce our weaponry in a significant way.”
• He offered to “write it down on a piece of paper,” but he indicated that he believed a handshake would be good enough.
• President Putin responded by stating that he appreciated the President’s decision to reduce U.S. nuclear forces and stated that Russia “will try to respond in kind.” He did not offer a target number for the reductions at that time, but he had stated several times in previous months, and repeated in December 2001, that Russia planned to reduce its forces to 1,500 warheads.
• He did, however, indicate that he would like to use the formal arms control process to reduce U.S. and Russian forces.
• He emphasized that the two sides should focus on “reaching a reliable and verifiable agreement on further reductions of the U.S. and Russian weapons.”
• Treaties to verifiably limit nuclear forces enhance Russian and U.S. security in two primary ways.
• First, they can help avoid expensive arms build-ups that would heighten geopolitical tensions.
• Second, they can lower the risk of escalation leading to nuclear use.

• The treaty was criticized for its inability to enforce the provisions, and having an expiry date.
• There were no verification provisions to give confidence, to either the signatories or other parties, that the stated reductions have in fact taken place.
• The arsenal reductions were not required to be permanent; warheads were not required to be destroyed and could therefore be placed in storage and later redeployed.
• The arsenal reductions were required to be completed by December 31, 2012, which was also the day on which the treaty was to lose all force, unless extended by both parties.
• There was a clause in the treaty which provided that withdrawal could occur upon the giving of three months' notice, and since no benchmarks were required in the treaty, either side could feasibly perform no actions in furtherance of the treaty, and then withdraw in September 2012.
• To be fair to both sides, neither expected SORT to succeed in its original intent.
• The historical record demonstrates that limits on missile defense do not secure restraints on offensive nuclear forces. Likewise, arms control agreements have been negotiated even after the United States has expanded its missile defense capabilities.

 Who wanted to cut down on nuclear weapon first through this treaty?

• President George W. Bush entered the White House in 2001 vowing to cut U.S. nuclear weapons to “the lowest possible number consistent with our national security.” Similarly, Russian President Vladimir Putin supported lowering deployed U.S. and Russian strategic forces to less than 1,500 warheads.
• At that time, U.S. and Russian arsenals each contained close to the 1991 START I limit of 6,000 “accountable” warheads apiece but the Kremlin’s forces were projected to decline more rapidly and deeply because of financial and technical limitations.
• The two presidents differed on how to pursue smaller forces. Bush advocated unilateral reductions so the United States could readily alter the size and composition of its arsenal over time.
• But Putin favored codifying reductions in a treaty to help preserve some parity and predictability between the United States and Russia. Facing persistent pressure from both the Kremlin and top U.S. lawmakers, the Bush administration agreed to negotiate a legally binding accord.
• Nonetheless, the final product conformed closely to the Bush administration’s predisposed positions of minimizing constraints and maintaining flexibility. This also ensured that the reductions not, actually, restrictions.
• Russia entered the negotiations in search of a “legally binding” treaty that would make “radical, real, and irreversible” reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons.
• It succeeded in achieving the first of these two objectives. Russian officials and other Russian analysts have stated that this outcome represented a major success for Russian diplomacy.
• Where the US initially wanted simply to exchange letters or issue a Joint Declaration, Russia convinced it to negotiate and sign a formal arms control treaty. In doing so, these officials argue, Russia could be assured that, as Russia reduces its nuclear forces in response to economic pressures, the United States will also reduce its nuclear forces so that the two retain a rough nuclear parity.
• Furthermore, the treaty ensured that the U.S. commitment to reduce its forces would continue to exist after the Bush Administration left office.

• START was a bilateral treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.
• The treaty was signed on 31 July 1991 and entered into force on 5 December 1994. The treaty barred its signatories from deploying more than 6,000 nuclear warheads atop a total of 1,600 inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and bombers.
• START negotiated the largest and most complex arms control treaty in history, and its final implementation in late 2001 resulted in the removal of about 80 percent of all strategic nuclear weapons then in existence.
• Proposed by United States President Ronald Reagan, it was renamed START I after negotiations began on the second START treaty.

• The New START Treaty is a treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on measures for the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.
• It entered into force on 5th February, 2011.
• It is a successor to the START framework of 1991 (at the end of the Cold War) that limited both sides to 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads.
• It continues the bipartisan process of verifiably reducing U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals by limiting both sides to 700 strategic launchers and 1,550 operational warheads.
• It will lapse in February 2021 unless extended for a five-year period.

How was SORT superseded?

• The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), and New START in 2010 were major contributions to both countries’ security.
• SORT would have expired on December 31, 2012 if not superseded by New START. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, also known as the New START Treaty, entered into force on February 5, 2011.
• Under the Treaty, the United States and Russia were required to meet the Treaty’s central limits on strategic arms by February 5, 2018; seven years from the date the Treaty entered into force. On February 5, 2018 both parties announced they had fulfilled those commitments. Each Party has the flexibility to determine for itself the structure of its strategic forces within the aggregate limits of the Treaty.
• Verification measures under the Treaty include on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the Treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring.
• To increase confidence and transparency, the Treaty also provides for an annual exchange of telemetry on an agreed number of ICBM and SLBM launches.
• The Treaty’s duration was ten years, unless superseded by a subsequent agreement.
• The Parties may agree to extend the Treaty for a period of no more than five years. The Treaty includes a withdrawal clause that is standard in arms control agreements. The 2002 Moscow Treaty was terminated when the New START Treaty entered into force.

 Aggregate limits

• 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments
• 1,550 nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments (each such heavy bomber is counted as one warhead toward this limit);
• 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
• The New START Agreement, negotiated by the Barack Obama administration, would have expired in February 2021, which would have led to the lapse of the protocols for exchanging information provided by the New START of 2011. The consequence of the treaty’s demise could have been a dangerous and expensive new arms race.
• With only two days remaining until its expiration, the US and Russia officially extended the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for five years, keeping in place the treaty’s verifiable limits on the deployed strategic nuclear arsenals of the world’s two largest nuclear powers.
• The US State Department and the Russian Foreign Ministry issued separate statements Feb. 3, 2021 announcing that the formal exchange of documents on the extension had been completed. The treaty was set to expire Feb. 5. Around a year later, Russia launched its war on Ukraine.
• US plans to build limited homeland missile defenses against “rogue nations” like Iran and North Korea, or even missile defenses deployed abroad to protect allies against such threats, should not be incompatible with future nuclear arms control agreements with Russia.
• To be sure, given the gamut of intractable issues, such as non-strategic nuclear weapons, space strike systems and hypersonic capabilities, the next round of nuclear arms control negotiations will not be easy. But missile defense, as history shows, will not be the deal breaker.